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Technological Capability and Development 




The most important issue for development centres on the debate about the centrality of 
knowledge, technology and innovation to the process of economic development. While this 
much is broadly agreed, what is at issue is the precise mechanics of overcoming economic 
development challenges in different contexts. At the heart of it all is about how economies 
at different levels deploy the unending streams of information and knowledge to 
developmental ends. In time, the notion of income convergence between the poorer South 
and the wealthy North has proved a mirage, while a new economic divide has in fact 
occurred within the South itself, and as well, between regions and within regions. The 
debate relating to latecomers is thus framed in discussions about regions and countries 
that arrive late to mastering industrialization in achieving economic prosperity through the 
use of knowledge. In other words, a new divide has emerged among the latecomers 
themselves, and with it, greater conceptual complexity in the ways of our understanding of 
the divergent ways of economic development. 
In this paper, we enter this debate acutely aware of the complexity of this process; we are 
equally persuaded that economic development is largely driven by innovation - by this we 
do not mean R&D or frontier science - but ways and dynamics of process, product and 
organizational changes is embedded within specific and varied contextual institutions.  
Technological change is a cumulative and path-dependent process, in order words, 
national or firm level actions taken in previous times condition the current state of 
capabilities. The literature is replete with different taxonomies of capabilities that adopt 
different definitions, terms, deepness and focus, but all of them have in common the 
description of different levels of complexity of technological effort for the recipient or 
related actors; and, the functions/actions of the firm(s) are seen as the focus. The one 
important common denominator in all these definitions is that they refer to knowledge, 
skills and experience as core elements of the concept of technological capability.  
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In taking this debate forward, we explore in this paper, the implications of the differences in 
technological capabilities for the innovative performance of countries. What kinds of 
capabilities are required to boost the transition from the lower domains of knowledge (that 
are purely informal and traditional production-oriented) to highly skilled science-based 
knowledge domain (at the frontier), and what role does the physical and technological 
infrastructure of countries play in this transition? 
2. Technological Capabilities in a Latecomer Context  
We develop a framework to understand the processes by which firms and countries move 
from one level of knowledge domain through other, by building technological capabilities. A 
firm needs external knowledge on a continual basis to regenerate itself failing which it 
might well stagnate or regress. A firm’s connection to its external partners (buyers, 
suppliers, etc) is essential for building capabilities because as we noted earlier capability 
acquisition is largely driven by interactive learning conducted with a multiplicity of firms, 
and non-firm organizations. We show that the stage-wise gradation of firm/country from 
one level/domain to the other over time involves several heuristic feedback loops. 
Catching–up is both a mountain climbing metaphor as it is a marathon challenge where 
firms and countries practically run the gauntlet and whereby failure is costly. The notion of 
latecomer therefore signifies the fact that the entity (country or firm) is late to meeting up 
certain key capabilities compared with both the forerunners as well as competitors. We 
elaborate upon the different domains of knowledge and how each of these domains are 
inevitably related to levels of technological capabilities and differential modes of learning. 
The literature is replete with different taxonomies of capabilities that adopt different 
definitions, terms, deepness and focus, but all of them have in common the description of 
different levels of complexity of technological effort for the recipient or related actors; and, 
the functions/actions of the firm(s) are seen as the focus. The one important common 
denominator in all these definitions is that they refer to knowledge, skills and experience as 
core elements of the concept of technological capability. 
A number of useful taxonomies have been elaborated by several scholars including Lall 
(1992), Ernst et al, (1998) and Bell and Pavitt (1992) among others. The authors defined 
and classified technological capabilities in six types of functions with the great variety of 
knowledge and skills positioned as the core elements, which firms need for them to 
acquire, assimilate, use, adapt, change and create technology. 
The taxonomies are functional categories, which follow a roughly sequential order of 
complexity. On this we provide a slightly modified version, which is:  
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1. Production and Manufacturing Capabilities: refer to the knowledge and skills used in 
plant operation. It is divided into three broad types of activities: a) production 
management; b) production engineering, and c) repair and maintenance of physical 
capital. 
2. Investment capabilities: knowledge and skills needed to undertake the functions of 
identification, preparation, design, setting up and commissioning of new industrial 
projects, or the expansion and/or modernization of existing ones. This category has 
two main elements: a) pre-investment capabilities and b) project execution capabilities. 
3. Re-Design and Product Modification capabilities: are the firm’s ability to adapt and 
improve continuously its products and processes. It includes: a) reverse engineering; 
b) analytical design, and c) system engineering capabilities. This is what is found in 
most latecomer countries and to a considerable degree in advanced latecomers as 
well as frontier countries. 
4. Marketing and Network capabilities: includes the knowledge and skills required for 
collecting market intelligence the development of new markets, the establishment of 
distribution channels and the provision of customer services. Firms also possess the 
ability and organizational competence to transfer technologies within the firm, among 
firms and between firms and the domestic scientific and technological infrastructure. 
5. Design and New Products and Process Capabilities: knowledge and skills required for 
the creation of new technology, design new features of products and processes, and 
the ability to spread out scientific knowledge in developing patentable ideas. 
We seek to explore the implications of the differences in technological capabilities and 
innovative performance of countries. What kinds of capabilities are required to boost the 
transition to knowledge-based sectors and supporting that what role physical and 
technological infrastructure plays in this regard? 
2.1. Levels of Capabilities, Learning and Development 
Technological learning is the way firms accumulate capabilities (Malerba, 1992). It involves 
not just technical learning but learning to build the right kinds of organizations and to foster 
the institutional forms within which policies would make the expected impact. In the last 
three decades we have learnt a great deal about the nature and processes by which 
latecomer countries acquire capabilities but we also have a long way to go in constructing 
a framework that systematically takes account of the diverse and increasingly 
differentiated paths of development being taken by latecomers. Much has been learnt 
through firm-level studies (Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Hobday, 1995) but there is a 
growing level of dis-aggregation among latecomers that we need to begin to address them 
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on this basis (see Figure 1). For instance most of the current work focus on the success 
cases of East Asia “advanced” latecomers to understand the reasons and different 
pathways to success while much less has been done on the lagging (“falling behind”) firms 
and countries. With these countries learning has come to be conceptualized on the 
strength of R&D carried out and patents taken just as in the case of industrialized 
countries. In the lagging latecomers, learning is difficult to quantify, measure or even 
observe because much of the activity, including incremental technical change is 
experiential and tacit in nature. At a conceptual level, R&D is not equal to innovation as it 
is as an instrument of learning. Non-R&D activities (prototype building, design and quality 
testing for instance) tend to consume a much higher proportion of firm-level level 
investment in new products and processes and this is highly disconnected from the limited 
R&D taking place in the local contexts. In essence, orthodox measures create a 
misleading impression of the learning processes in latecomer countries.   
Essentially, technical change or innovation is largely incremental but nonetheless useful in 
advancing productivity growth and has been classified into three different categories (Bell, 
1984). First we have technical change that involves the introduction of new techniques 
(products and processes) into the economy through new investments in plants and 
machinery. This type of technical change broadens the industrial base of the economy. 
The second form of technological change involves evolutionary (incremental) improvement 
to existing techniques by effecting technical change to existing products and third, the 
generation of new knowledge through research within the firms or within separate R&D 
institutions. 
So how and what explains the process by which countries and firms move from one level 
or knowledge domain to the other? The observed structure of knowledge or sets of 
capabilities that one finds in an economy is a result of cumulative technological mastery 
and investment efforts made over a long time. In other words, technological change is a 
cumulative and path-dependent process, in order words, national or firm level actions 
taken in previous times condition the current state of capabilities. In short technological 
capabilities acquisition processes are not just strongly cumulative in nature they have 
elements of strong path dependence (Dosi, Nelson et al. 1997). The conceptual and 
empirical literature on technological capabilities (TC) blossomed in the late 1980s received 
considerable attention from the mid-1980s through and early 1990s (Westphal, Kim and 
Dahlman 1985; Ross-Larson et al,1987; Lall,1990, 1992; Mowery, 1993; Bell and Pavitt, 
1993, 1995). Several authors refined the typologies and elaborated upon them but 
essentially the key ideas revolve around the same concepts1. The essential elements of 
                                                 
1 Authors Nelson and Winter (1982) developed the notions of “routines”. Bell (1984), Scott-Kemmis 
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the framework are as follows:  
1. TC focuses on efforts to “make effective use of technological knowledge in production, 
investment and innovation Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985) [p. 171]’.  
2. The process has strong heuristic elements of feedback from previous experiences to 
current states and as such skills and knowledge gained in previous domain becomes part 
of the organizational memory of firms and nations that create a new capability domain 
resulting in more efficient techniques and systems2.  
3. The build up of capabilities therefore entails individual and organizational “learning” 
(Lall, 1987, 1990, 1992; Dahlman and Westphal 1982; Katz 1984, 1987; Dahlman, Ross-
Larson et al., 1987). The process is re-conceptualized as essentially efforts by 
organizations to master technological functions though learning driven by explicit 
investment.  
4. Firms and nations require explicit investment capabilities in order to identify, prepare, 
design, set up and commission a new industrial project (or an expansion of it). In other 
words if the processes of capability build up must continue, this set of skills and experience 
will be built in a co-evolutionary process with technical capacity.  
5. As technical change and innovation do not take place in isolation and is only possible 
within a network of other actors, firms and countries require a systemic framework. This 
has been conceptualized as “linkage capabilities” which knowledge and experience 
required to foster interactive learning (see point 3 above).3 
2.2. Knowledge Domains as they relate to technological capabilities and 
development 
A firm needs external knowledge on a continual basis to regenerate itself failing which it 
might well stagnate or regress. A firm’s connection to its external partners (buyers, 
suppliers, etc) is essential for building capabilities because as we noted earlier capability 
acquisition is largely driven by interactive learning conducted with a multiplicity of firms, 
                                                                                                                                                     
and Bell (1988), Katz  (1987), used “technological capacity” to described the learning processes 
involved in building up a minimum base of essential knowledge to engage in innovative activity. 
2 Dahlman, Ross-Larson et al., (1987) conceived TC as the ways to use existing technology to 
produce more efficiently and to use the experience gained in production and investment to adapt 
and improve the technology in use. 
3 Linkage capabilities are defined as “…the capacity of forging co-operation between managers and 
workers within the firm, for securing co-operation between firms in the supply chain, and for crafting 
co-operative interfaces between firms and the wider institutional milieu, be it local, regional, or 
international” (Cooke and Morgan 2000). 
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and non-firm organizations. The inter-relationships between knowledge, learning and 
technological capabilities are not necessarily captured by functional dimensions of 
knowledge commonly discussed in the literature that focus specifically on systematic work 
related to new knowledge creation. This constitutes but one dimension of the science, 
engineering and technology (SET) domain that makes up a large part of the national 
knowledge systems. But in a more holistic perspective, a national knowledge system 
consists of four such domains: 
1. The largely science-based domain with scientists and engineering research and 
development (R&D) as the dominant activity. The actors are mainly research scientists 
and engineers working in these private and government research laboratories. 
Contrary to what conventional wisdom and popular indicators suggest, this knowledge 
domain employs only 10% of science and engineering (S&E) manpower in the most 
research-intensive country, USA. According to the NSF (2006), of the approximately 
15.7 million individuals have a first degree in S&E in 2003, and a smaller 11.9 million 
has an S&E as its highest degree. 90% of these S&E professionals are non-R&D 
workers. 
2. The second domain is the Design and Engineering component which involves 
systematic engineering and scientific specification of products, processes, systems 
including computer hardware and software. In this category, 13% of S&E manpower is 
employed in the US, while close to 20% work in non-S&E fields of project management 
and related areas. Notably, 66% of the total US S&E professionals work in what is 
termed non-S&E occupations, many of which are in management and marketing.  This 
component is linked more directly to knowledge domain 3 below, which is the 
manufacturing and production component rather than R&D although outputs of applied 
research and development feed into this sub-system. 
3. The third domain is the modern production and manufacturing establishments with 
engineers as well as skilled technicians but less so scientists as the dominant actors. 
The locus of activity here is the factory and manufacturing centres.     
4. The fourth level of knowledge domain is the informal or traditional sector, which 
characterizes developing environments. The main actors are artisans, crafts persons 
and technicians. The locus of activity is the diverse but structurally homogeneous 
maintenance and repair garages, clusters of low technology, traditional products and 
production processes such as indigenous knitwear, leather and footwear making and 
so on. The mode of knowledge is largely skill-based tacit and experiential. There are 
three characteristics of this knowledge base. First, the actors are largely low-level 
skilled workers and apply low-level technologies based on a mix of modern and 
traditional methods to manufacture. Second, it is largely disconnected from component 
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3 (of modern manufacture and production) although it is not unusual that it draws raw 
materials such as for instance scrap metals, manufacturing rejects and so forth as 
inputs. Third, its disembodied (human) knowledge is equally disconnected from formal 
educational centres and laboratories although it is a large part of the economies of 
developing countries. 
There are a wide range of capabilities that are required to match the four broad knowledge 
domains as they all demand different skills, and policy frameworks to create and sustain 
the knowledge bases. The observed structure of knowledge or sets of capabilities that one 
finds in an economy is a result of cumulative technological mastery and investment efforts 
made over a long time, and it determines the learning curves of firms, sectors and 
countries over time. 
Figure 1 shows the stage-wise gradation of firm/country from one level/domain to the other 
over time reflecting the heuristic feedback loops involved. Catching–up is both a mountain 
climbing metaphor as it is a marathon challenge where firms and countries practically run 
the gauntlet and whereby failure is costly. The notion of latecomer therefore signifies the 
fact that the entity (country or firm) is late to meeting up certain key capabilities compared 
with both the forerunners as well as competitors. The four different domains of knowledge 
and these domains are evidently related to levels of technological capabilities. 
Furthermore, the mode of learning is also related to the level of capability that a firm or 
country has accumulated, as figure 1 shows the learning and capability ladder. 






















































The figure presents the inter-play between the different knowledge domains, the levels of 
technological capabilities involved to operate in each knowledge domain and the learning 
process in transgressing from one domain to the next higher one. The amount of learning 
and skills required to move from the lowest domain of artisanal and indigenous 
manufacturing to the second lowest knowledge domain of modern manufacturing are 
embedded in primary and secondary schooling capacities, apprenticeship training, training 
to read engineering designs and blueprints and organisation of production. Several of 
these aspects are missing in developing countries – foundary making, metal cutting, and 
so on – are essential skills to move to the next higher level but a hiatus in several most 
developing countries since they constitute “nodes of learning” (Rosenberg, 1976). To move 
from here to the next higher knowledge domain to design and re-engineer products and 
innovate, one needs not only primary and secondary schooling but tertiary education that 
equips individuals with technical and analytical skills and public sector investments into 
building basic R&D capabilities for standards, metrology and other infrastructure. To 
operate in this domain, a country also requires significant entrepreneurial capabilities 
which act on the ‘demand side’ of the market, and act to stimulate demand for certain 
kinds of products (Rodrik, 2007). The learning associated with transitioning to this 
knowledge domain is more systematic and systemic, rigorous and has to be sustained 
over a long period of time and capable of being replicated across several sectors. It also 
requires an unlearning of several of the conventional ways of conducting the innovation 
business in these countries. This means new perspectives on collaboration, public-private 
partnerships, education system design and administering of courses as well as new 
entrepreneurship models. For a country to move from here to the final knowledge domain, 
learning becomes concentrated in R&D activities and can be measured using conventional 
indicators, such as patents, skilled employees, and so on. At this level, the absorptive 
capacity of firms/entities relies on concentrated efforts in key facilities by highly specialised 
individuals who conduct research and design activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This 
is the level where orthodox measure of R&D as a source of national knowledge begins to 
apply. 
 
Economic history shows that whereas countries move easily from the lowest knowledge 
domain to the next higher one, moving further up into knowledge domains that focus on 
incremental design and innovation and then to frontier innovation is ridden with lack of 
success. Several countries on a supposedly sound catch-up path often do not move as 
predicted or regress along this path mainly due to the inability of these countries to 
manage the coordination efforts required in setting up a sound basis to move to the next 
knowledge domain. This is not surprising since the efforts required are significant and 
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need to be designed to combat both market failure and government failure simultaneously. 
Merely focusing on industrial policy that does not take into account the scale effects, 
thresholds of scientists of engineers and minimal standards of domestic knowledge 
infrastructure as well as conducive policy environment for domestic innovation are 
common flaws in latecomer countries. Box 1 below uses the case of learning in Chinese 
computer industry to illustrate the point further. 
Box 1: Learning in Chinese Computer Industry  
China has become a significant global player by building a strong production base for both 
domestic and export markets. In many product categories, it has become the number one 
producer in the world. The same can be said for the Chinese computer industry though it is 
still relatively far from the frontier and is located at the end of the industrial value chain. 
The industry evolved from doing simple imitations, as firms accumulate capabilities 
through active participation in international computer industrial technology. Firms have 
adapted and through this process and made huge profits through the integration and 
development of Chinese characters processing technologies into new models of 
computers. One of the keys to their success is mastering the core components, 
namely, integrated circuits, chips design, and software mould. The international 
market played a very important demonstrating role at the initial stage of development. 
Chinese firms learn by responding to international consumers’ needs and making changes 
to old computer models through supply service and sales of imported computer. During the 
1980s, the learning modes of firms did not involve the master of core technology and the 
knowledge of key fields. Since the 1990s, more and more multinational corporations 
entered into China, many world-class PC producers like COMPAQ, DELL, HP, and IBM 
set up factories in China. As the domestic market became more competitive, multinational 
corporations have gradually accelerated the modes and speed of technology diffusion. The 
flow of technology increased as more and more multinational computer corporations set up 
R&D centers in China.  
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Policies to foster higher technological capabilities of countries will have to be broadened to 
include a wider variety of sources and instruments. For countries at lower levels of 
technological development, R&D is largely made up of activities on the shop floor rather 
than organized work in formal laboratories. Technological knowledge assimilation, 
absorption and creation proceeds on the back of imported technologies through learning, 
and traditional and resource-based sectors still dominate the production landscape. As 
countries progress to more complex stages of learning to produce, formal R&D becomes 
important and assumes centre stage in knowledge creation. For example, India and China 
still have the largest portion of GDP coming from agriculture (15 and 25% respectively), as 
opposed to other OECD countries which all have less than 3% of their GDP from 
agricultural trade and a significant percentage of their GDP accrues form RD intensive 
sectors and activities. If one would broaden the table to include other developing and least 
developing countries, the percentage of GDP accruing from traditional and resource based 
sectors such as agriculture will correspond inversely with the stage of development. 
3. Constructing a Technological Capability Index  
In order to understand, empirically analyse and present these differences, we now 
consider two indices namely physical infrastructure and technological capability indices to 
illustrate what countries require in order to move along the catch-up ladder. We have a 
total of 75 countries according to two indices of physical infrastructure and technological 
capability. Unlike most other studies, we rank the countries over time, more specifically 
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over the period 1990-2003, in order to identify the dynamics of changes over time in the 
ways these countries evolve. Furthermore, the ranking over the whole period is tested 
econometrically using two panel data models of technological capabilities (innovation) and 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The former examines the relationship between 
different levels of physical infrastructure and how it differs across technological divides, 
while the latter studies the relationship between GDP per capita and knowledge generation 
and how it differs across income and technological divides. 
Next we formulate indices of physical infrastructure which lead to the country ranking 
which is then tested using an econometric model followed by the technological capability 
index and present the derived country ranking. The yearly rankings according to the two 
indices are presented graphically in the appendix. Table 1 presents the three categories of 
countries that is derived from the country ranking, namely frontier countries, fast followers 
and latecomers. Because of data limitation over the whole period, the following indicators 
are considered in constructing the technology capability composite index (TCI): high-
technology exports (% of manufactured exports), internet users (per 1,000 people), and 
fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) are proxies for technological 
capabilities (TC); and electric power consumption (kwh per capita), roads (total network in 
km), and telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) are proxies for physical infrastructure 
(PI).  
Each technological capacity (TC), institution (I) and physical infrastructure (PI) indicator 











where Xit is either of the TC, I and PI indicators for country i at period t and min Xt and max 
Xt are the minimum and the maximum of the indicator at period t. We rank our 75 countries 
according to this composite index of technological capability and physical infrastructure in 
each year of the period 1990-2003 and (on average) over the whole period. In doing so, 
we can identify how countries perform over time, i.e. whether they remain the same, if they 
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14. France 
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35. South Africa 
36. Lithuania 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the indicator of the technological capability 
composite index per group of countries in 1990 and 2003  




Mean (Std. Dev) Mean (Std. Dev) 







































































(174.649) 749.495 (322.172) 227.754 (161.009) 760.087 (524.166) 


































547.040 (103.839) 260.758 107.033 97.269 (73.300) 293.512 (209.871) 
Number of 
countries  
24 24 27 75 
Source: Calculated by authors from WDI, 2004. 
The overall technological capability composite index is an unweighted average of the 
technological capacities and physical infrastructure indices. The technological capacities 
and physical infrastructure indices are themselves unweighted averages of the TC and 
PI (normalized) indicators, while the I index is the single (normalized) I indicator.  
Our rankings help to demonstrate a deep correlation between knowledge accumulation, 
infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities. Table 2 shows the mean of the different 
proxy variables, and we observe that some countries such as Malaysia that scored 
highly on knowledge indices because of their infrastructure fall on the technology 
composite index (into group 2 countries) due to its relatively lower high manufactured 
exports when compared to other group 1 countries. Several other countries such as 
India and China and Latin American countries continue to be in the same country groups 
for both the knowledge variables as well as the technology capability composite index.4 
At the other end of the spectrum, countries like Nigeria scored very low in both 
knowledge and technological capability indices due to consistent underinvestment in 
infrastructure, particularly electrical power. 
4. An Econometric Panel Model of Technological Capabilities 
The country rankings in table 2 are purely descriptive. In other words, one lets the data 
                                                
4 See Oyeyinka and Gehl Sampath, Latecomer Development: Innovation and Knowledge for 
Economic Catch-up, Forthcoming, 2009, for the construction of a knowledge index that explores 
these inter-linkages further. 
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speak and there is no underlying (economic nor econometric) model that explains them. 
In this section we would like to validate the rankings using an econometric model that 
explains technological capabilities by proxies of institution and physical infrastructure. 
The model is described by equation 2, 
,21 itiititit PIIndexIIndexTCIndex ???? ????  
where TCIndex it is the technological capability index, IIndex it is the institution indicator, 
and PIIndex it is the physical infrastructure index of country i at period t; a i denotes the 
individual effects and eit denotes other unobservables that explain technological 
capabilities. Equation (2) is estimated for 3 groups of countries, namely group 1 that 
consists of the first 24 countries (United States-Italy), group 2 that consists of the next 24 
countries (Malaysia-Mexico), and group 3 that consists of the next 27 (Panama-Benin). 
We also estimate the model for all the 75 countries and test for equality of the 
parameters ß1 and ß2 across the four groups.  
We estimate equation (2) using panel data techniques, i.e. the fixed-effects or within 
estimator, the random-effects using generalized least squares (GLS) estimator, and the 
random-effects using maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). The results are shown in 
Table 3 and suggest that the “elasticity” of technological capabilities with respect to the 
institution indicator is negative and significant for country group 1, positive and 
significant for country group 2, and positive and insignificant for country group 3 and 
when all countries are taken together. The “elasticity” with respect to physical 
infrastructure is similar for the first 2 groups and smaller for group 3, which when 
compared to groups 1 and 2 has the smallest “elasticity”. The last two columns of Table 
3 allow us to test the equality of the parameters using a likelihood ratio (LR) test. With a 
?2(15) = 261.79, we very strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality of the parameters 
across the 4 groups (p-value=0.000). 
 
(2) 
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Table 3: Technological capabilities panel data linear regression estimates 




Coefficient  (Std. 
Err.) 
 Fixed-effects Random-effects GLS  Random-effects MLE  
Country Group 1 
Technology capability 
index  
-0.307** (0.084) -0.401** (0.087) -0.358** (0.085) 
Physical infrastructure  
index  
2.669** (0.210) 1.247** (0.126) 2.033** (0.263) 
Intercept - - 0.209** (0.069) -0.115 (0.125) 
Number of observations 336 
Country Group 2 
Technology capability 
index  
0.099 (0.086) 0.027 (0.084) 0.053 (0.085) 
Physical infrastructure  
index  
1.715** (0.149) 1.411** (0.138) 1.522** (0.150) 
Intercept - - -0.017 (0.045) -0.044 (0.049) 
Number of observations 336 
Country Group 3 
Technological capability 
index  
0.068† (0.040) 0.073* (0.034) 0.072* (0.034) 
Physical infrastructure  
index  
0.762** (0.126) 0.604** (0.098) 0.608** (0.103) 
Intercept - - 0.012 (0.012) 0.012 (0.012) 
Number of observations 378 
All countries  
Technological capability 
index  
-0.102* (0.045) -0.147** (0.041) -0.155** (0.041) 
Physical infrastructure  
index  
1.956** (0.102) 1.362** (0.056) 1.426** (0.071) 
Intercept - - 0.038 (0.020) 0.029 (0.022) 
Number of observations 1050 
Significance levels:     † : 10%     * : 5%     ** : 1%  
Source: Authors calculations  
Again the results validate the hypothesis underlying the framework and the country 
rankings. For instance, the percentage of high technology export in group one countries 
is more than 4 times that of group three, infrastructure represented by fixed and mobile 
line connection in group one is 9 times that of group three and twice that of all the 
countries mean. The same applies to electrical power, which also has a nine fold factor 
difference. In the specific cases of the emerging power houses of China and India we 
again see how underlying knowledge and technological capacity determine their different 
positions on the groupings ladder. For instance, high technology export from China 
which was 7.9% of export jumped to 29.9% in 2005 with the concomitant increase in 
R&D spending per GDP  of 1.3% compared with India’s which have remained at 0.8% 
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since the 1990s. In absolute terms, China invests 72 billion US$ on R&D (2005). The 
number of researchers in China currently matches that of the EU25 (OECD, 2007). 
While China produces 500,000 engineering graduates, India produces 350,000. 
Evidently, China has made more explicit investment in builing physical as well as 
technological infrastructure, which reflects in both manufactured and high technology 
exports. At the same time, India is not able to sustain its economic growth merely due to 
its lagging infrastructure (recent estimates are that India loses about 1-2% of its annual 
growth to weak physical and technological infrastructure).  
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have developed a framework to understand the processes by which 
firms and countries move from one level of knowledge domain through other, by building 
technological capabilities. A firm needs external knowledge on a continual basis to 
regenerate itself failing which it might well stagnate or regress. A firm’s connection to its 
external partners (buyers, suppliers, etc) is essential for building capabilities because as 
we noted earlier capability acquisition is largely driven by interactive learning conducted 
with a multiplicity of firms, and non-firm organizations. We show that the stage-wise 
gradation of firm/country from one level/domain to the other over time involves several 
heuristic feedback loops. Catching–up is both a mountain climbing metaphor as it is a 
marathon challenge where firms and countries practically run the gauntlet and whereby 
failure is costly. The notion of latecomer therefore signifies the fact that the entity 
(country or firm) is late to meeting up certain key capabilities compared with both the 
forerunners as well as competitors. We have elaborated upon the different domains of 
knowledge and how each of these domains are inevitably related to levels of 
technological capabilities and differential modes of learning. 
Using macro data from a total of 75 countries on these indices, over the period 1990-
2003, we identify the dynamics of changes over time in the ways these countries evolve 
and build technological capabilities. The analysis of the 75 countries is conducted by 
acknowledging that countries reflect acute divisions in physical and technological 
infrastructure that impacts upon their abilities to catch-up. By grouping the countries into 
frontier countries, fast followers and latecomers, the paper presents determinants of 
technological capability in the context of late development. It links knowledge domains 
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for catch-up phenomenon, which concerns the persistent differences in the rates of 
growth of countries, to the ways and processes firms and nations build up technological 
capabilities. Both the descriptives and the econometric model developed in this paper 
advances our understanding of levels of development (domains indicate a country stage 
in the catch-up ladder) and the processes that links knowledge domains to learning and 
accumulation of technological capabilities. Modes of learning are different for each 
stage of technological capabilities building, and these are intricately linked to knowledge 
domains.  The results contain several implications for theory and policy on innovation 
and development. 
The results shown in Table 2 suggest that the “elasticity” of technological capabilities 
with respect to the institution indicator is negative and significant for frontier countries, 
positive and significant for fast followers (country group 2), and positive and insignificant 
for slow learners and laggards (country group 3). The “elasticity” with respect to physical 
infrastructure is similar. In other words, for these countries to catch-up with fast 
followers, they need to raise the contributions of these variables significantly. 
Our analysis shows that the current domain of latecomer countries, which could be 
described as developing in relative terms compared with industrialized countries differ in 
a variety of ways and specifically relating to the three elements reflected in the 
technological capability analysis in this paper. First, frontier economies belong to the 
group one domain characterized by high science- intensive and technology-intensive 
activities, with relatively high levels of domestic investment in R&D. Second, the frontier 
and fast learning group have developed the design engineering capabilities to relatively 
high level while late learners are largely engaged in mastering production. Third, the 
frontier and fast followers have also developed through explicit investment in training 
high levels of skilled manpower, although a large number of countries classified in the 
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